Abstract: Medical devices which are developed for human application can be used for diagnostic purposes. Researchers faced with some of the complex tasks that are making a medical device safe for human use. This means that the device should be safe, accurate and cost effective risk management that involves the identification, understand, control, and prevent failures that results in hazards exposures while humans use medical devices. Risk and hazard analysis, is a structured tool for evaluating the potential problems that could lead to encountered in connection with the use of taking a drug, or using a medical device. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance analysis of risk analysis, application of risk management tools, and the benefit of the risk management process. The final goal is to minimise use-related hazards, assure that intended users will be able to use the medical devices safely and effectively throughout the product life cycle, and to facilitate review of new device submissions and design control documentation.
Introduction
The globalisation of the medical device in a marketplace, combined with the growth of medical device usage, has led a significant increase in complex task of making a safe medical device among device manufacturers. Risk management has become an important competitive tool to gain access to foreign markets. As clinicians, patients, regulators, and litigators has become more sensitive to some safety issues related to human factors, and the importance of appropriate translation and safety controls will increase. Risk management is necessary to ensure device usability (Braybrooks, 1997) safety and regulatory compliance, critical human factors and risk management decisions in some cases, depends on language in the user interface or labelling. For instance, hazardous situations can arise based on improper interpretation of date/time information or units of measurement displayed (Braybrooks, 1997) . Mitigation of those risks is typically a key focus during initial device development for the initial locale (e.g., the USA); but the impact of localisation on this kind of items is often not as carefully identified, controlled, verified, and validated. FDA's quality system regulation is intended to give manufacturers 'the flexibility to determine the controls that are necessary to be commensurate with risk'. FDA sees risk analysis as an essential requirement of the regulation but it can only gives little guidance on risk analysis approaches and procedures such as fault tree analysis (FTA) or failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) (Palanichamy, 2007) . After review and updates on various approaches in risk analysis, a medical device company may find value in what other industries including chemical, aerospace, and defences have learned about using it to reduce the risk (Palanichamy, 2007) . Companies can manage and reduce risk more effectively by including risk thinking as early as possible in device or process development and revisiting those issues systematically throughout the development process.
Overview of risk managements
As risk managements focuses on identifying, quantifying, characterising uncertainties with the losses risk managements essentially turns into a effort to manage those uncertainties. Risk managements utilise a number of formal techniques methods, tools, including trade off analysis, cost benefit analysis, risk effectiveness, multi-attribute decision analysis, etc. (Braybrooks, 1997) . Risk management is the most important and diverse part of risk analysis, as it involves many disciplines from subject matter to experts to risk and decision analysis. A good risk management effort even in the presence of potentially risk significant systems and technologies can be very effort to avert, control and to minimise the loss. Risk management focuses on identification, understand, control, and prevent failures that can result in hazards when people use medical devices. Manufacturing company needs to identify and to calculate the all possible hazards that arise in both normal and fault condition. If any risk is judged unacceptable, it should be reduced to acceptable levels by appropriate means (Braybrooks, 1997; Palanichamy, 2007) .
Why should we perform risk management?
1 system identifies that the manufacture provides a safe device 2 risk analysis is now required as per law 3 for product liability 4 to ensure that any unsafe device that does reach the market place are significantly identified and efficiently corrected
We cannot complete or eliminate the risk but we can manage it to some points. There are some steps that can be used in risk management.
1 develop written definitions of what needs to be done and how to do it 2 define responsibilities and accountability 3 define what needs authorisation and who is responsible for handling it 4 define the skills and knowledge necessary to implement the system and a provision for training those who do not possess these skills.
Risk control
It is the process through which decisions are made and to provide protective measures to implement or maintaining a risk in a specified level (Palanichamy, 2007) . Once risk control measures have been identified (must be implemented and evaluated for effectiveness).
Control options

Risk control and monitoring activities
Actions intended to eliminate or reduce each risk to meet the previously determined risk acceptability criteria. Risk controls may begin as early as design input and continue over the medical device life time. Some regulatory schemes prescribe a fixed hierarchy of risk controls (Gollakota et al., 2011 ) that should be examined in the following order: inherent safety by design protective measures in the device or its manufacture information for safety, such as warnings, maintenance schedules, etc. (Palanichamy, 2007) .
Risk control measures
Protective measures, e.g., default operating modes Information for safety, e.g., warnings in labelling (Sawyer, 1997) .
Safety risk zone
a Hazards that fall into safety risk zone 1 (R = 1) are considered generally acceptable or minimal and require no further analysis (Palanichamy, 2007) .
b Hazards that fall into safety risk zone 2 (R = 2) are considered conditionally acceptable but require analysis and mitigation (Morencis cited in Gritting, 1994) .
c Hazards that fall into safety risk zone 3 (R = 3) are generally unacceptable. If hazards in safety risk zone 3 cannot be further mitigated to the point of falling into an acceptable risk zone (R = 1 or 2), a formal risk/benefit analysis shall be performed and documented (Morencis cited in Gritting, 1994; Palanichamy, 2007) . 
Mitigation
It means 'what you will do about this situation'.
1 First line of defence • avoid or eliminate failure causes second line of causes
• identify the failure third line of defence
• reduce impacts.
Hazard analysis
The term 'hazard' refers to the potential for producing undesired consequences without regards to the frequency of Loss, for example the nuclear power hazard is release of large amounts of radioactivity to the environment due to an accident that could lead to a number of possible undesired consequences such as land contamination (Morencis cited in Gritting, 1994) . Therefore the large radioactivity release can be considered a hazard associated with nuclear power plant. Before the final design to develop, a basic hazard analysis has to conduct for baseline hazards which are associated with a device. In short, the analysis consists of listing the major components and operating requirements of the device and evaluating their potential hazards (Braybrooks, 1997) . The component that could include raw materials, wastes, hardware, monitoring and control systems, human-device interfaces, services. Hazards analysis is a tool to evaluate potential problems which could be encountered in connection the use of any number of things from driving a car, riding on public transportation, taking a drug, or using a medical device. Hazards is a condition or physical situation with a potential for an undesirable consequence (Palanichamy, 2007) in a risk basement a survey of the processes under analysis should be perform to identify the hazards. Presumably, each of these hazards will be a part of the system of interest and normal system barriers will be used as means of their containment. This means that, provided there is no disturbance in the system, the barrier that contains the hazard remains unchallenged. However, in a risk scenario one postulates events and actions that remove or degrade such barriers, and estimates the final consequence from these challenges. Therefore, development of scenario involves identification of hazards, barriers, potential challenges to such barriers, and amounts of hazards exposed (Palanichamy, 2007 ). An FTA is an effective top-down approach. The team starts with the undesired consequence or top event and identifies the initiating and contributing events that must occur to produce it. These events are combined using logic gates. The top event is the injury resulting from pacemaker installation or operation. Below this there are two sub-events named as patient and operator injury. Since either can produce top event hence they can combined using OR gate. Under operator injury branch, one potential scenario has been identified that have device contaminated with a biohazard such as blood. Since both the events must occur for an injury to take place, so it can be combined using an AND gate (Gupta et al., 2006) . The greatest benefit that the events contributes most frequently to top event can be identified readily mitigation measures can be focussed on reducing frequency of the event (Halperin et al., 2008) . 
Risk assessment
An iterative process of assessing a product's benefited/risk balance. Developing and implementing tools to minimise risk while preserving its benefit. There are some resources.
1 ISO 14971 -application of risk managements to medical device 2 FDA guidance -incorporating human factors to risk managements, premarketing risk assessments. The operation of a system can be considered from two opposite viewpoints-FTA, or success tree analysis. Most of the construction and analysis methods used in literature are, in principle, the same for both fault trees and success trees (Braybrooks, 1997 ). PRA's primarily use fault trees for modelling subsystems and barrier failure probabilities. Therefore we focuses on the fault tree method and high light how the results of FTA can be modified and used for success tree analysis results. The fault tree development is a deductive process by means of which an undesirable event called top event, is postulated, and the possible ways for this event to occur are systematically deduced. For example, a typical fault event could be failure of control circuit A to send a signal when it should. The deduction process is performed so that the fault tree considers all component failures that contribute to the occurrence of the top event (Sawyer, 1997) . It is also possible to include individual failures modes of each element of the system as well as human and software errors during the operation (Palanichamy, 2007) . The fault tree itself is a graphical representation of various combinations of failures that lead to an occupancy of top event.
FDA approach
1 the FDA regulates medical devices in US 2 the device made in US 3 device imported in US 4 device exported from US.
The FDA has published guidance documents 1 when the results of a process cannot be fully verified you need to validate the process 2 design control guidance for medical device manufacturers March 1997.
Procedure analysis
We know that FMEA and FTA allow human errors in design, development, operation of medical devices, it is necessary to conduct a separate analysis which focuses on procedures.
Typically, a what-if approach is used for this type of analysis. Procedures are grouped in process steps; each process step is evaluated to determine if an undesirable outcome results in incorrect procedures. It is always important to check (Consoli et al., 2007) whether any changes made during design process and safety hazards are not being introduced in design process. To check small changes we require what if report and for larger changes we require FMEA (Palanichamy, 2007) . There are some software which can be used to control a medical device and this software have to be reviewed during the design process. We know procedures can be grouped to process steps, similarly software's also can grouped to process steps. Three generic sub functions are evaluated for each primary function (Braybrooks, 1997) .
1 function the software component does not perform its intended function correctly per its original design intent 2 timing the software component perform its function at the wrong time 3 data the software component performs its function using incorrect or corrupt data 4 finally it is important to have a means of detecting software errors or a means to detect the effects of software errors on a device.
ISO 14971: 2007
ISO14971 is a risk management standard for medical devices adopted by at least the EU and the US. "Its purpose is to help manufacturers establish a medical device risk management process to identify hazards, eliminate and evaluate risks, and to develop, implement, and monitor the effectiveness of risk control procedures" (Palanichamy, 2007) . It requires the medical device manufacturer to establish a process to manage and control risk for each and every medical device they make, apply it and maintain it throughout the medical device life-cycle, and make sure the process complies with ISO 14971. It requires top level management involvement. It requires that the process be subject to periodic review of the process. It requires documentation be produced and that those documents be inspected (Drew and Gini, 2006) and reviewed. It requires that responsible personnel be trained to use it. It requires a risk management plan. The risk management plan must define the scope of the risk management activities, assign responsibilities and authorities, specify review requirements, establish risk acceptability criteria, and explain the collection of production and post-production data (Hansen et al., 2010) . Have a complete record in a file and keep that file up-to-date. It is the specified standard for risk management used to demonstrate compliance with the risk management requirements of the medical devices directive (MDD). The standard addresses risk management to patient, operator, other parties, external equipment and/or the environment. Risk management process ISO 14971 requires the manufacturer to establish, document and maintain a risk management process for: 
Process validation
Process validation means establishing by objective evidence that a process consistently produces a result or product meeting its predetermined specifications (Sawyer, 1997) . There are two areas particularly important in process validation. 
Process requirements
It's typically have:
1 process specifications 2 product specifications 3 work instruction 4 suitable equipments.
Validated process also has 1 process parameter control 2 qualified operators 3 additional recordkeeping requirements
The problem
1 the product (in-process or final) that results from a process should be verified (inspection, test, etc.) to demonstrate it meets specified requirements 2 for the requirements you can verify, put in a verification (test or inspect) step.
The solution
When the results of a process cannot be fully verified you need to validate the process.
SEP risk assessment model
The SEP model is a 'quick and dirty' risk assessment process that can be easily used here, risk (R) = severity (S) * exposure (E) * probability (P) identify specific hazards and assign them a value for each element below; the higher the number, the greater the severity, probability or exposure (Sawyer, 1997) .
Severity
Should something go wrong, the results are likely to be found in the following area: injury, occupational illness or death property damage or loss, mission degradation should something go wrong, the results are likely to be found in the following area:
1 none 2 minimal 3 significant 4 major 5 catastrophic.
Probability
The likelihood that given the exposure, the projected consequences will occur. training, situational awareness morale and attitude change are used to mitigate probability.
1 impossible or remote under normal conditions 2 unlikely under normal condition 3 50/50 chance 4 greater than 50% chance 5 very likely.
Exposure
The amount of time, number r of cycles, number of people and resource involved.
1 none or below average 2 average 3 above average 4 excellent, Finally, compute the value of risk (R = S × E × P) to evaluate the effectiveness of mission and risk of execution.
The topics that are describes have been used in design and development process of medical device. FTA is being used by pacemaker manufacturers based on FDA guidance for software aspects of 510 (k) notification submissions for medical devices. There are some other computer-controlled medical devices that are needed to review using FTA as FTA is a primary tool for risk analysis (Palanichamy, 2007) . FMEA is a good choice for those medical devices are used away from plasma and blood viral inactivation devices and some other intravenous solutions. The key for successful medical device design is to start early. A hazard analysis can be useful to find concept of highest inherent safety. But while design development process starts, it will allow making necessary changes without affecting the project schedule. The further along in the design process that changes are identified, the fewer choices are available to mitigate (Dankelman et al., 2010) hazards without significant schedule implications. Risk management activities will identify opportunities to improve device performance. The benefits in conducting medical device design in risk management is significant, always a trade off in how to manage a risk. Hardware-software is more reliable than humans and be found as more effective (Sawyer, 1997) . However, since there is need for human interaction in the operation of all medical devices, the element of risk needs to be adequately evaluated. Minimising the level of routine human intervention will reduce risk and improve efficiency. Such risk reduction must be weighed against the cost of automating tasks that can be performed by individuals (Palanichamy, 2007) .
